

Table 1

South Vietnam: Estimate of Communist Losses
1965-1967

	<u>1965</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>
KIA	35,000	57,000	65,000
Seriously Wounded	19,000-30,000	30,000-49,000	36,000-56,000
Captured	6,300	8,000	9,000
"Chieu Hoi" Returnees (Military)	9,500	11,500	10,000
Deserters	9,500	11,500	10,000
	<u>79,300-90,300</u>	<u>118,000-137,000</u>	<u>130,000-150,000</u>

Table 2

South Vietnam: Allocation of Communist Losses, by Force
1966-67

	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>
NVA	29,000-35,000	50,000-60,000
VCMF	34,000-39,000	35,000-40,000
Irregulars, Cadre, Support	55,000-63,000	45,000-50,000
	<u>118,000-137,000</u>	<u>130,000-150,000</u>

B. The Manpower Situation

Within VC controlled areas the South Vietnamese population amounts to at least 3.5 million people. Depending on the extent of VC access to contested areas this figure could be as high as 5 million, most of whom live in the delta region. About 500,000 physically fit young males are contained in the controlled population. Each year an additional 30,000 - 35,000 youths become old enough to fight. In 1965 the VC recruited an estimated 80,000 personnel and probably will recruit from 7,000 to 10,000 per month in 1966, which is close to their maximum capability. The refugee problem has little effect on the VC recruitment effort, because the majority of refugees are coming from areas other than the delta and include few able-bodied males.

During 1966 the VC will have to make up for their estimated losses of 90,000 - 100,000 men at the same time that they are attempting to increase their force by about 5,000 troops. In addition they may provide replacements for some NVA losses, although total infiltration from North Vietnam of 70,000 to 90,000 troops may be enough to expand the NVA troop level by an estimated 49,000 troops and ^{Cover}~~even~~ most NVA losses. At any rate the total VC military manpower requirement will probably amount to at least 100,000 - 110,000 which is near the upper level of VC recruitment capabilities. During 1967 the recruitment and training capabilities of the VC will not be adequate to cover the expected casualty rate of 130,000 - 150,000. North Vietnam will thus have to shoulder more of the manpower burden and will experience additional pressures on its manpower resources.

North VietnamA. Manpower Resources

We estimate that North Vietnam has ample manpower resources -- at least in quantitative terms -- to support substantial increases in its armed forces and military related activities without severely retarding essential civil/economic activities. Despite such factors as a recent "partial mobilization" and indications of the increased use of women in the agricultural sector and in the militia, North Vietnam still has large enough reserves of labor in the female population, in educational institutions, in the service industries, and in sectors where labor is under-employed to more than meet prospective demands. This reservoir, however, probably does not include a large supply of skilled labor, much of which has already been siphoned off to take part in war associated activities; and the regime is still faced with problems in managing the allocation of manpower.

Roughly 200,000 persons have been called into military service in North Vietnam in 1965 and thus far in 1966 to support the war effort in South Vietnam and to reach and maintain a total strength slightly in excess of 400,000 men in the armed forces. As many as 95,000 North Vietnamese troops may have been infiltrated into South Vietnam -- perhaps 70,000 in 1966 alone -- both as replacements and fillers for troops lost as a result of the fighting and as additions to force levels in the South. It is assumed that the troops moving south and those retiring because of age or illness are being replaced. The actual number of persons being retired or discharged probably is not very great at present. Total conscription in North

Vietnam probably has approached the number of physically fit males reaching the draft age of 18 in 1965-66. However, a large number of persons still remains in the estimated pool of about 2.1-2.3 million males age 15-49 who are physically fit for military service. A large share of this pool would, in fact, be available to the military if the regime resorted to full mobilization, with Hanoi reporting over 1.7 million women ready to replace men in the labor force. At least 400,000 men and women now serving in the militia probably are already devoting about half of their time to military activities.

B. Recent Developments

On 17 July 1966 Ho Chi Minh issued a "partial mobilization" order. Although North Vietnam had been mobilized on a selective basis for several months, the 17 July order supposedly mobilized additional forces. No specific evidence of the latter mobilization has become available, however, and it is possible that the partial mobilization served merely as a propagandistic exhortation to the North Vietnamese people and actually reflected call-ups already initiated. The propaganda benefits were immediate, with thousands of men and women reportedly applying for enlistment; but, again, there is no evidence that even these volunteers have been placed on active duty.

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